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Abstract 
This paper identifies and charts a number of longer-term trends that led ultimately to the United 
Kingdom’s 23 June 2016 in-out referendum on European Union membership. It shows in 
particular how a device, the referendum, until recently regarded as anathema to the British 
tradition of parliamentary democracy, was first legitimised, then constitutionalised and, 
simultaneously, popularised. And it shows how manifesto commitments for a referendum on 
the single currency morphed into commitments for a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty 
and then the Lisbon Treaty and then into referendum lock acts and, finally, the in-out 
referendum.  
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1. The world before referendums (1950-1967) 
Butler and Kitzinger (1976, pp. 8-11) describe how the referendum, as a possible electoral 
device, had first been considered in UK politics in the 1890s. Subsequently, Arthur Balfour, 
Stanley Baldwin and Winston Churchill all dabbled with the idea as a means of resolving 
constitutional blockages, but the use of a referendum was never a realistic prospect. It is in any 
case clear that if the United Kingdom had responded positively to the 9 May 1950 Schuman 
declaration and if Clement Attlee and Herbert Morrison had subsequently signed the 18 April 
1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (admittedly, two 
very big ‘ifs’), there would surely have been no referendum. When, in May 1945, Churchill, 
the then-Prime Minister, suggested that a referendum be held on whether to extend the life of 
the wartime coalition until Japan had been defeated, the Deputy Prime Minister Attlee refused, 
sternly declaring:  
I could not consent to the introduction into our national life of a device so alien to all 
our traditions as the referendum which has only too often been the instrument of Nazism 
and Fascism (quoted in Bogdanor, 1981, p. 35). 
 
What had happened in the meantime, as Attlee reminded the Prime Minister, was the 
use of the plebiscite by Germany’s National Socialist Party as a means of consolidating its 
power, in particular through the 19 August 1934 plebiscite that confirmed the assumption by 
Adolf Hitler of the functions of Chief of State in addition to those of Chancellor, and a similar 
use of the so-called plebiscitary election in fascist Italy in March 1929 and again in March 1934, 
also as a way of consolidating power.1  
                                                          
I am indebted to my friend and colleague, Anthony Teasdale, for his comments, criticisms and suggestions 
regarding an earlier draft of this paper, and for many conversations and discussions over the years on the subject 
of why and how the UK seemed never able to achieve ‘escape velocity’ (see the concluding section of this paper). 
I would like to thank David Earnshaw, James Hanning, Tim King, Philippe Legrain and Sir Graham Watson for 
having read and commented on earlier drafts of this paper. 
1 Denis MacShane has pointed out that, before 23 June 2016, the last time a major European country withdrew 
from an international organisation on the basis of a referendum was the 12 November 1933 German decision to 
withdraw from the League of Nations (author’s notes from a 14 October 2016 talk given at the LSE European 
Institutute’s The European Union in Practice seminar series). 
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In any case, none of the European Coal and Steel Community’s six founding Member 
States found it necessary to organise a referendum – though some of them had been no strangers 
to referendums on constitutional issues in the recent past, and France would continue to 
organise referendums sporadically on other issues. For its part, the UK had certainly not held a 
referendum regarding the signature of the 4 April 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, with its mutual 
defence clause (nor the preceding 17 March 1948 Treaty of Brussels). Nor had the same Attlee 
government ever imagined holding a referendum regarding ratification of the 5 May 1949 
Treaty of London, which created the Council of Europe and would soon produce the European 
Convention on Human Rights (which entered into force on 3 September 1953) and the European 
Court of Human Rights (21 January 1959).2  
The same hypothetical claim could surely have been made about the 25 March 1957 
Treaty of Rome. Though, following the Suez debacle, Harold Macmillan had only taken over 
from Anthony Eden at the beginning of that year, his Conservative government was still sitting 
on a 60 seat majority. France would switch from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic just over a 
year later via a constitutional referendum (28 September 1958), but the Treaty of Rome was 
signed and ratified without any such public approbation. Indeed, in all six founding Member 
States the Treaty was ratified through parliamentary procedures. In short, there was not a 
referendum in sight in 1957.  
Nor would there have been a referendum had the UK’s 1961 application not been vetoed 
by French President Charles de Gaulle (14 January 1963) and had accession negotiations been 
successfully brought to a conclusion. At the 8 October 1959 General Election, Harold 
Macmillan had been returned with a 100 seat majority. He had prepared meticulously for the 
application. With such a majority he could afford to ignore resistance within his own party and 
                                                          
2 And nor would the Anthony Eden government see any reason to seek popular approval for the September 1955 
Treaty of Association between the UK and the European Coal and Steel Community. 
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appoint dedicated pro-Europeans to key positions. Announcing the application to the House of 
Commons, Macmillan declared that:  
No agreement will be entered into until it has been approved by the House after full 
consultation with other Commonwealth countries by whatever procedure they may 
generally agree (Macmillan, 1961). 
 
Thus, the House of Commons and the Commonwealth had effective vetoes, but not the 
people. The subsequent 4 August 1961 vote in the House was unambiguous. The Government’s 
proposal was approved by 313 votes to 4, with the Labour Opposition and some fifty 
Conservative MPs abstaining. There was no language about a referendum and no call for one. 
However, “The level of abstention suggested the absolute necessity of negotiating satisfactory 
entry arrangements” (Crowson, 2007, p. 29). It was a point MacMillan acknowledged when 
writing to thank his parliamentary whips: the principle of entry, and the terms of entry, were 
two different matters. It was a distinction Harold Wilson’s Labour Party would exploit to good 
effect in 1974.  
As to the people, one historian has observed that, “There was indeed an almost complete 
absence of any public opinion in the United Kingdom about the European Communities until 
1962, by which time the negotiations for entry had already been underway for nine months” 
(Milward, 2012, p. x). Another historian adds: 
Opinion polls showed two-thirds of voters did not know whether Britain was a member 
of EEC or EFTA, or else gave an incorrect answer. Throughout the negotiations those 
who approved of the government’s initiative outweighed those who disapproved, 
although the proportion offering no opinion remained high (Crowson, 2007, p. 31). 
 
The opportunities of 1951, 1957 and 1961 provide rich material for counterfactual 
historical analysis and certainly fell into the category of “Britain’s great missed chances in 
Europe” (Denman, 1997, p. 222). History would, without a doubt, have been very different if 
the UK had managed to join the emerging EC at such relatively early stages in its development. 
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However, from the point of view of this paper, that first 1961 move contained significant seeds 
of future complications or, to put it another way, chickens that would come home to roost. 
In the first place, the UK did not apply alone. The Danish and Norwegian economies 
were so closely tied to the UK economy (notably through the UK-created European Free Trade 
Association) that it made little sense for them to remain outside the EEC if and when the UK 
had joined it. They therefore sent in their applications shortly after the UK’s application 
(Denmark on 10 August 1961 and Norway on 30 April 1962). Although Ireland was never an 
EFTA member, its economy was so closely tied to the UK’s that it even anticipated the British 
application, applying on 31 July 1961. For its part, the EEC decided to organise the negotiations 
in parallel, as a package, although there was no mistaking the fact that the UK was the big fish.3 
Subsequently, when de Gaulle rejected the UK’s application at the eleventh hour, the three other 
countries withdrew their applications. But an enduring relationship had been established 
between the candidatures of the four countries – they would always be seen as a bloc (de Gaulle 
would later dismissively refer to the group as ‘the British and their associates’ (cited in George, 
1994, p. 38) – and significantly all of them, with the sole exception of the United Kingdom, had 
constitutional provisions for the holding of referendums.  
In the second place, any first application for membership of the EEC beyond that of the 
original founding six would have been significant.4 As such a major economy and powerful 
country with a trans-Atlantic tradition, the UK’s application would have been additionally 
significant. But for it to bring three other candidate countries in its train was of massive 
significance. It meant that the six would become ten. It would have major repercussions on the 
                                                          
3 The Commission’s ‘package’ approach could at least in part be attributed to the fact that it had already decided 
to negotiate with EFTA as a bloc, rather than with the individual member countries of that organisation. (Crowson, 
2007, p. 28) 
4 The honour of first accession could conceivably have fallen to Spain, but who now remembers Spain’s 14 
February 1962 application, renewed two years later? See, for example, Royo, 2002, p. 8 Of course, Francoism 
made Spanish accession politically unthinkable. 
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institutions (voting rights in the Council, additional Commissioners, MEPs, judges, and so on). 
And a French-inspired organisation would absorb four Anglo-Saxon/Nordic countries.  
In the third place, as the July/August 1961 debate and vote in the House of Commons 
had demonstrated, the issue of the UK’s relationship with the unfolding European integration 
process cut through both the main parties, as it has done ever since.5 This meant inevitably that 
any future referendum, were it to occur, would almost certainly have to be fought on a cross-
party basis. Thus whether the ‘beginning’ of what would become the ‘end’ is traced back to 
Wilson’s opening of the referendum Pandora’s box in 1974 or Heath’s refusal to open it in 
1972, the proximate cause remained the same: large majorities of MPs in favour, combined 
with major divisions within the main parties. 
Lastly, the UK’s first application gave rise to a number of phenomena that would 
become increasingly familiar in the years to come.  
A first was the organisation of new groups seeking to mobilise public and parliamentary 
opinion against entry. Some of these – for example, the Anti-Common Market League, Women 
Against the Common Market and Keep Britain Out – aspired to become national and non-
partisan. Others – for example, Britain and the Common Market and the Labour Committee on 
Britain and the Common Market – sought to mobilise within the main political parties (see 
Richardson, 2016, for a good overview). If the people had been irrelevant to the politicians’ 
calculations to date, that would no longer be the case. As Milward observed: “It can, though, 
be safely said that it was with the application that the people came for the first time to be an 
influential factor in the United Kingdom’s relationship to the Communities” (2012, p. 341).  
A second occurred on 22 November 1962 in the South Dorset by-election. A dissident 
anti-Common Market Conservative candidate, Sir Piers Debenham, won 5,057 votes, thus 
                                                          
5 Throughout the 1950s the Labour Party had remained hostile to the European integration process, but by the end 
of the decade economic realities had begun to convince the party’s social democratic wing that a more constructive 
approach would be necessary. Abstention on the Common’s vote was a means of maintaining a semblance of unity 
on the issue. See, for example, Daniels, 1998 and Kassim, 2010. 
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denying the official Conservative candidate, Angus Maude, victory (he won 13,079 votes) and 
gifting what had been a safe Conservative seat to the Labour candidate, Guy Barnett (who won 
13,783 votes). This was the first example of what was to become a potent political force in the 
1990s and again in the 2010s. It was not so much that Euro-sceptics might win seats (though 
UKIP in the European Parliament and Douglas Carswell in the House of Commons ultimately 
proved that they could), but that they could threaten the majorities of sitting MPs – particularly 
Conservative MPs. The potency of this threat was in inverse proportion to the size of the party’s 
governing majority: the smaller the majority, the more powerful the threat. 
 
2. Enter the concept of a referendum (1967-1972)  
When the United Kingdom made a second application for membership on 10 May 1967, 
the other three countries rapidly followed (Denmark and Ireland on 11 May and Norway on 21 
July). These new applications were at first similarly blocked by de Gaulle (27 November 1967). 
His successor, Georges Pompidou, had a change of heart and a 1-2 December 1969 Summit of 
the Six agreed that negotiations should start. But when, in early 1972, those negotiations had 
been successfully concluded and the EEC stood on the cusp of its first enlargement, the French 
President announced, on 16 March 1972, his decision to hold a referendum on the enlargement 
package. Ostensibly, Pompidou felt the change to be of such momentous significance that the 
approval of the French people should be sought. However: 
While it is easy to grasp the international kudos to be gained by securing the French 
nation’s approval for an enlargement of which he had been the principal architect, the 
appropriateness of such a dramatic procedure as a referendum on an issue on which 
there was scarcely any opposition (except among the Communists and a section of the 
Gaullists) was questionable. Indeed, it seemed like a political exercise for domestic 
consumption (Berstein and Rioux, 2000, p. 66). 
 
France’s referendum (23 April 1972), with 68% of those voting in favour of 
enlargement, was followed by a referendum in Ireland (10 May), which approved the 
constitutional amendment necessary for the Republic to accede, with almost 84% of those 
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voting in favour. Next, on 25 September, Norway held a popular referendum in which, after an 
animated public debate – and despite a large parliamentary majority in favour of joining, a 
53.5% majority voted to reject membership. Lastly, on 2 October 1972, the Danish people voted 
in favour of membership by a 63.3% majority. 
Meanwhile, in the UK, on 28 October 1971, after some 300 hours of debate, the 
sovereign House of Commons voted in favour of accession, with 356 in favour and 244 against 
– a majority of 112.6 Thirty-seven Conservative MPs voted against. Sixty-nine Labour MPs, 
led by Roy Jenkins, voted in favour. The Labour Party was badly split. The official party line 
was, as seen above, to oppose entry ‘on Tory terms’. Pro-accession Labour frontbenchers were 
instructed to remain silent during the debate – or toe the Party line. In July Prime Minister 
Edward Heath had rejected the need for a referendum, telling the Central Council of the 
Conservative Party’s National Union that the House of Commons had the constitutional 
sovereignty to decide (Crowson, 2007, p. 38).7 But this position of insistence on the sufficiency 
of parliamentary sovereignty was taken against a backdrop of apathetic, if not negative, public 
opinion. (Ibid.) The lack of popular support would later provide potent ammunition to those 
determined to argue that the people had been ‘cheated of’ or ‘denied’ their say.  
In his pronouncements before the 1970 General Election Heath also seemed to have 
confused intentions or, at any rate, raised doubts: 
In a speech in Paris in May, when it was becoming increasingly clear that an election 
was to be called, Heath had said that the EEC could not be enlarged without the ‘full-
hearted consent of the peoples and Parliaments’ of the applicant countries. Heath later 
argued that anyone who knew the British constitution should have known that he was 
referring only to approval by Parliament and that he was not hinting at the possibility of 
a referendum. But the fact remained that he had referred to ‘peoples and Parliaments’ 
rather than to the people through Parliament. His words were to return to taunt and haunt 
him (Wall, p. 360). 
                                                          
6 It is an obvious point, but the longer the UK’s applications had taken, the farther the European integration process 
had gone, the greater the gap to be leapt had grown and hence the more to which Parliament had to agree. Moreover, 
as Crowson has pointed out (2007, p. 30), the longer the negotiations had taken, the more the calls grew for an 
alternative to be sought. Lengthy negotiations implied difficult negotiations. 
7 The Conservative Party’s June 1970 manifesto had promised to open negotiations whilst avoiding overtly 
committing to entry, but Heath considered the General Election result to be a sufficient mandate. 
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In his memoirs, Heath insisted that “I could not have meant anything else, as the 
referendum was a device unknown to our constitution,” but he also admitted that “The 
complication arose because there was already talk of a referendum on the issue…,” concluding 
that “Perhaps I could have been more precise in my language when I talked of ‘full-hearted 
consent,’ but I will always maintain it was unfairly exploited” (Heath, 1998, pp. 362-363). 
Heath duly signed the accession treaty in Brussels on 22 January 1972. But the 
parliamentary fight was not yet over. After a series of narrow parliamentary votes, Royal Assent 
was finally granted on 17 October 1972, with the UK formally acceding to the EC on 1 January 
1973. This Act: 
…represented a novel constitutional departure; one that was contested. The 
proposal for membership created divisions between, and within, both main parties. 
Although both Houses voted overwhelmingly in support of the principle of the 
membership, the short bill to give legal effect in UK law to membership was bitterly 
contested, the government achieving the second reading of the bill through a vote of 
confidence. The bill was opposed consistently by the Labour opposition and dissident 
Conservative back benchers, though passage of the bill was achieved eventually, 
courtesy of Liberals and some abstaining Labour MPs, and without amendment. The 
act enabled the United Kingdom to become a member of the EC, with important 
consequences for the UK constitution, including creating a juridical dimension 
unparalleled since before the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Parliament (…) provided 
for its own legislation to be subordinate to that of the EC, while adapting to the new 
situation through the creation of committees to scrutinise European documents (Norton, 
19 November 2010). 
 
To be clear: in formal terms, no referendum was held in the UK in 1972 because of the 
doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament. But unlike in 1961 there were calls for one. Already, 
on 10 December 1969, a Conservative MP, Bruce Campbell, moved a bill arguing that the 
electors should have the right “to decide by way of referendum whether Great Britain should 
enter the European Economic Community”. He said: 
The three major parties have all declared themselves to be in favour of this country 
joining the Common Market. It therefore follows that this question will never be an 
election issue and the people will have absolutely no chance of ever being able to 
express their views on it through the ballot box at a General Election (quoted in Butler 
and Kitzinger, 1976, p. 10). 
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Fifty-five MPs voted in favour of Campbell’s bill. Then, in April 1972, the anti-
Common Market Conservative MPs Neil Marten and Enoch Powell tabled an amendment to 
the European Communities Bill calling for a consultative referendum on entry. By then, 
Labour’s position had changed. Indeed, Labour’s Shadow Cabinet decided to support Marten's 
amendment (Roy Jenkins opposed the policy on principle and resigned as Deputy Party Leader 
and many Labour MPs abstained on the division). Moreover, as has been seen, there was a 
proliferation of referendums elsewhere on precisely the same issue: in Ireland and Denmark 
and Norway, and ‘even’ in France.8  
This raises a moot point and another interesting counterfactual question: what if the UK 
had joined alone, in isolation, and there had been no other referendum? There would, then, have 
been less chance for the perception to arise that somehow the British people had been ‘cheated’ 
of their say (although people could still have reached that judgement independently of what 
might or might not have happened elsewhere). There would in particular have been no counter-
examples of the Danish, Irish and Norwegian people having their say whilst the British 
allegedly did not. And there would have been no Norwegian counter-example of popular 
rejection of membership. After all, Norway and its brave people had been close to the British 
heart since the Second World War, and now they had voted to stay out of the EC, despite a 
massive parliamentary majority in favour of joining. (Nor, in the longer-term, would the ‘myth’ 
have been created of the Norwegian possibility of rejecting membership, but somehow 
prospering and maintaining a distinct identity all the same.)  
Last but far from least, public opinion for much of the negotiating period was opposed 
to membership – by as much as a margin of two to one at times. As one newspaper reported on 
1 January 1973: 
                                                          
8 Edward Heath would later declare: “The French referendum was an internal matter for President Pompidou and 
the French government and should not have made any difference to our own ratification of the Treaty. It is not for 
the British to cast aspersions on the referendum procedures in other countries, nor should we mimic them 
inappropriately” (Heath, 1998, p. 541). 
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Britain enters the European Common Market on New Year’s Day almost equally 
divided on whether the historic move is a good idea, the latest public opinion poll 
showed Monday. The survey appeared to indicate a belated swing toward public 
acceptance of the act of membership. Earlier polls showed the British voters, some 60 
percent, against entry. The newest survey found 39 percent of those asked were unhappy 
about joining the Common Market, 38 percent happy and 23 percent with no opinion 
(Daily Mail). 
 
The UK’s accession appeared not only to have been based on the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty but also a strictly Burkean concept of parliamentarianism.9 From the 
outset, therefore, the circumstances of the UK’s accession created the potential for it to be 
perceived or portrayed as having been achieved through parliamentary legerdemain and against 
the grain of public opinion. The absence of a written constitution did not help and, indeed, 
enabled those disposed to do so to indulge in such arguments as that the subsequent 1975 
referendum result could not be legitimate because the UK could not vote to stay in something 
that it had not, in constitutional terms, properly joined.10 As will be seen below, in seeking to 
provide future clarity and avoid such ambiguity, the 1997-2001 Blair administration would in 
effect entrench the principle of the referendum in British constitutional life (see Section 9 
below).  
 
3. The referendum becomes a reality (1974-1975) 
Thus were established various lines of argument that sought to undermine the 
fundamental basis of the UK’s subsequent relationship with the EC – because of the nature of 
the accession process. But, echoing Macmillan’s 1963 note to his advisers, another set of 
arguments would soon be established relating to the terms of entry. 
                                                          
9 Insistence on such a Burkean approach was also an important element in the success of the accession negotiations 
themselves. Stephen Wall quotes Britain’s then Ambassador to France, Christopher Soames, reassuring French 
President Pompidou that what mattered were the declared policies of the two main parties and ‘not the kerbside 
collections of the opinion pollsters.’ (Wall, p. 341) Ironically, given that he unexpectedly called a referendum on 
the outcome himself, Pompidou was not interested in closing a deal with the UK if that deal would then be subject 
to the vagaries of British public opinion. Edward Heath was surely fully aware of that consideration. 
10 This is a good example of the genre: http://www.vernoncoleman.com/euillegally.html 
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The accession negotiations were tough, but from Heath’s point of view there was no 
doubt that the prize was to be grasped. This determination was epitomised by his all-or-nothing, 
obstacle-clearing role in the 20 May 1971 Paris bilateral summit meeting with Georges 
Pompidou (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 2016).  Although there was, Wall relates, a “degree 
of contrived theatricality which was envisaged from the outset” (p. 386), it was always intended 
that the Pompidou-Heath summit should succeed.11 
With this determined steer from the top, the UK had joined with a tacit acceptance 
among its negotiators that the entry terms it had been obliged to accept would have to be 
adjusted/re-negotiated at some point in the future. For example, Stephen Wall’s authoritative 
account of the negotiations shows how British negotiators were always aware that the UK 
would end up, along with Germany, being a substantial net contributor and would need to revisit 
those terms subsequently (Wall, pp. 348, 377, 383). More generally, a Cabinet Ministerial 
Committee briefing paper concluded that: 
We are likely to get further with the Six, and especially the French, if we seek alleviation 
in the application of Community rules to us rather than challenge those rules as being 
unsound or inappropriate to our case. … Rather we should demonstrate to the Six that 
the unrestricted application to the enlarged Community of the financial arrangements 
agreed by the Six in December 1969 would place an intolerable and inequitable burden 
on our balance of payments (quoted in Wall, p. 362). 
 
As a distinguished member of the UK’s negotiating team more candidly put it: 
In one sense the terms were irrelevant. No sensible traveller on the sinking Titanic 
would have said, “I will only enter a lifeboat if it is well scrubbed, well painted and 
equipped with suitable supplies of food and drink.” Our historic task was to repair the 
mistakes of the past and to restore our position at the centre of European affairs. If, 
when we entered, we found any particular feature of Community arrangements 
intolerable, then our problems would have to be dealt with as part of the family. As the 
Community assured us, ‘If unacceptable situations arose the very survival of the 
                                                          
11 See “Condemned to succeed”: the Heath-Pompidou summit which took Britain into the E.E.C, May 1971, at the 
Margaret Thatcher Foundation for the full records and text of that summit: http://www.margaretthatcher.org/ 
archive/heath-eec.asp 
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Community would demand that the institutions find equitable solutions’ (Denman, 
1997, p. 233; see also pp. 243-244).12  
 
Meanwhile, the Labour Party remained badly split on the issue of membership. Harold 
Wilson, its wily managerial leader, was able to exploit both the manner of the UK’s accession 
and the terms on which it had entered, to fashion election-winning party unity. The Labour 
Party’s February 1974 General Election manifesto argued that:  
A profound political mistake made by the Heath Government was to accept the terms 
of entry to the Common Market, and to take us in without the consent of the British 
people… That is why a Labour Government will immediately seek a fundamental 
renegotiation of the terms of entry (cited in Denman, 1997, p. 247). 
 
The politicking and calculations that led to the UK’s 5 June 1975 referendum are well 
known (see Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, pp. 12-20). But in the light of what has subsequently 
occurred, the importance of the 1975 referendum cannot be over-estimated. Five particular 
aspects should perhaps be underlined.  
To begin with, the referendum was the first-ever national plebiscite in British politics – 
ever. The longstanding eschewal of direct democracy was no more. The principle that a 
referendum might be held had been acknowledged by Parliament, sovereign though it had 
always been and would always remain, through the Referendum Act 1975. The distance 
between opposition to, or acceptance of, that principle was clearly far greater than the distance 
between acknowledging that a referendum might be held and arguing that a referendum should 
be held. The 1975 referendum was undoubtedly the thin end of a wedge. 
Second, no matter what the language used about the consultative nature of any 
referendum result, the potential for discordance between what a majority of MPs, on the one 
                                                          
12 This ‘get in first and then sort things out’ approach interestingly echoes advice Jean Monnet gave Edward Heath 
in 1961, during the first application – advice that Heath found ‘tempting’. (Heath, 1998, p. 213) Wall cites Willy 
Brandt advising Heath in 1971 to stress to Pompidou ‘the extent of the very great efforts made by Britain to move 
towards the Community and its policies.’ (p.392) Clearly, Brandt’s reasoning was that these concessions were not 
just a consequence of the UK joining after the Club had been founded but also necessary gestures to convince the 
French that the British were determined to close the deal this time around – no matter what the cost.  
 13 
 
hand, and a majority of the people, on the other, believed had been irrevocably created. In 1975, 
those two majorities happened to concur; in 2016, they did not. That one day they might not, 
whatever the question, was always a possibility from the moment the principle of the 1975 
referendum was conceded by the British Parliament. As of 1975, the dangerous potential for 
dissonance lurked. Logically, any parliament would have to bow to the majority view of the 
people it purported to represent. Thus, the 1975 referendum was the thin end of another wedge. 
In this context, an exchange between Margaret Thatcher and Jeremy Thorpe during the 
11 March 1975 Commons debate on the referendum illustrates how she had already well 
understood that potential for dissonance and had, in effect, foreseen the situation that would 
ultimately arise in June 2016: 
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher 
It is said that the referendum is advisory or consultative. I believe that if there is a high 
poll and a clear majority, the result will in fact be binding on Parliament, whatever one 
may say in law about parliamentary sovereignty. I cannot envisage that a Parliament, 
whatever individual Members might have thought, if there were a clear vote against—
[Interruption.] It is not advisory or consultative in the event of a clear result. It would 
be binding on everyone. [Hon. Members: "No."] It would bind and fetter parliamentary 
sovereignty in practice… 
Mr. Jeremy Thorpe 
The right hon. Lady has enunciated a constitutional principle which some of us found a 
little difficult to understand. She said that in practice, if there were a large turn-out and 
a majority one way or the other, Parliament as a whole would be bound. Is she saying 
that that would over-ride the obligations that Members of Parliament entered into with 
their constituents at the previous election, which might be entirely different? 
Mrs. Thatcher 
…In law, the result could not fetter Parliament, but I believe that in practice it would… 
If there were an overwhelming decision one way or the other, I believe that in practice 
the decision in Parliament would follow the referendum result. 
Excerpt from Hansard HC [888/304-17]. Also available at Thatcher, 1975. 
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Third, perhaps more subliminally, because the first-ever referendum in the United 
Kingdom (a constitutionally momentous occasion, after all) was a referendum about the UK’s 
relationship with the European integration process, it created a sort of indelible link. Continued 
membership of the EU, it was implied, was an issue of such constitutional and political 
importance that it necessarily and quite logically could be addressed again by dint of a 
referendum. In retrospect, a principle of sorts had been established. 
Fourth, another subliminal and perhaps negative link had been created. As one 
commentator has recently put it: 
The vast majority of modern national referendums are about undertaking a new project, 
whether joining the EU, approving a new constitution or constitutional amendments, 
becoming a republic or an independent state. In these cases, the referendums invited 
countries to take a step forward into a new future – one in which life would be better 
than it had been before (Green, 2016). 
 
Thus, if such a presumption about referendums being perceived as opportunities to step 
forward is accepted, it meant that any take-it-or-leave-it referendum about EU membership 
would imply that leaving might represent an improvement. As Green argues, on 23 June 2016, 
many voters believed that they were being invited to step forward into a better future – although 
arguably it was an old, or previous future, or opt alternatively for a validation of the status quo.   
Fifth, by extension of the previous two points, the referendum device was not associated 
with accession per se (a decision that had, in any case, been ‘denied’ because of the 1972 
decision taken on the basis of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty), but with the 
satisfactory nature of reform/renegotiation and subsequent continued membership. The 
irrevocable fact of the matter was that the UK had, for better or worse, already acceded to the 
EEC. Membership could thus be perceived of as having been a fait accompli.  
Linking reform and a referendum was a monster that would not trouble successful Prime 
Ministers enjoying substantive parliamentary majorities, but would inevitably haunt ‘weak’ 
Prime Ministers with small majorities. Thus, in 1975, Harold Wilson, with a parliamentary 
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majority of just three seats, required public approval of the results of the renegotiations 
undertaken by James Callaghan. In 1984, Margaret Thatcher, with a parliamentary majority of 
144, did not consider such popular approval for the Fontainebleau agreement, although both the 
1975 and 1984 settlements were basically about the same issue – namely, the UK’s budgetary 
contributions and an acceptable rebate mechanism (related to the relative efficiency of British 
agriculture). In 1985, Margaret Thatcher (with the same massive majority) never for one 
moment countenanced a referendum about the Single European Act, constitutionally significant 
though it was (notably, for the introduction of qualified majority voting and a legislative role 
for the European Parliament). In 1993, on the other hand, John Major (majority of 21) was 
immediately under pressure to cede a referendum, although it was commonly recognised that 
he and his team had negotiated effectively and won satisfactory opt-outs, opt-ins and 
derogations from many of the Treaty’s most significant constitutional advances. 
Sixth, although there was a clear majority (67 per cent) in favour of remaining, the result 
was neither a strong nor a particularly positive one:  
The referendum was not a vote cast for new departures or bold initiatives. It was a vote 
for the status quo. Those who had denounced referenda as instruments of conservatism 
may have been right. The public is usually slow to authorise change; the anti-Marketeers 
would have had a far better chance of winning a referendum on whether to go in than 
one on whether to stay in. Before entry, to vote for going in would have been to vote 
radically. But after entry, it was at least as radical and unsettling to vote for leaving … 
the verdict was not even necessarily a vote of confidence that things would be better in 
than out; it may have been no more than an expression of fear that things would be 
worse out than in (Butler and Kitzinger, 1976, p. 280). 
 
Lastly, the referendum and all that had preceded it had not only demonstrated that 
“Europe was now an issue for parliamentary rebellion” (Crowson, 2007, p. 43) but had 
legitimised such rebellion. 
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4. Maastricht and the Kraken reawaken (1992-1997) 
From 1979 until the mid-1980s the UK’s relations with the EEC were epitomised by 
Margaret Thatcher’s combative attitude towards the EU and her determination to win the UK a 
proportionate budgetary rebate, culminating in the settlement reached at the June 1984 
Fontainebleau European Council meeting. The subliminal impression given, once again, was 
of an unsatisfactory relationship arising out of unsatisfactory terms (unsatisfactorily 
renegotiated). In its 1983 election manifesto, the Labour Party, under Michael Foot, pledged to 
begin negotiations to withdraw from the EU “within the lifetime” of the following Parliament. 
It was notably such policy stances that had prompted Roy Jenkins (European Commission 
President, 1977-1981) and a number of pro-EEC Labour MPs to establish the Social Democratic 
Party in 1981.  
Thereafter, though Thatcher’s combative attitude continued, with the new French 
President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, acting as sparring partner, it seemed 
that her second administration might develop a more constructive role. After all, the 1986 Single 
European Act might not have been entirely to Thatcher’s liking, but its core objective of 
creating a single market by 1992 was a project to which she and her government could not only 
enthusiastically sign up but which she could unashamedly champion. The Labour Party too, 
under the reformist leadership of Neil Kinnock, was gradually converted to a pro-EU stance, 
helped by the creation of a flanking ‘social Europe’ that would lead to the 1989 signing of a 
Social Charter. But the latter was anathema to Thatcher. On 20 September 1988, she took 
advantage of a speech to the College of Europe to state: “We have not successfully rolled back 
the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a 
European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels” (Thatcher, 1988). Frictions 
steadily grew with her Finance Minister, Nigel Lawson, and Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, 
over policy towards Europe and particularly towards the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
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Thatcher was increasingly sceptical about resurgent moves to create a European single 
currency. In protest at her interference, Lawson resigned on 27 October 1989. Howe, who had 
already been sidelined and appointed Leader of the House of Commons, resigned from that 
position on 1 November 1990. By 22 November 1990, Thatcher was gone and  another 
subliminal message had been sent: ‘Europe’ had brought about the downfall of Margaret 
Thatcher – still a popular figure on the right and considered by many to have been the UK’s 
greatest post-war Prime Minister. Just as importantly, Euroscepticism now had a doughty 
figurehead. 
Although Europe had continued to be a source of division and friction within the two 
main political parties and between them, by the late 1980s membership was a given on both 
sides of the political divide. But by 1989 history was on the march. On 9 November 1989 the 
Berlin Wall fell and it became apparent that Germany would unify and that Europe was about 
to undergo major geo-political change. Momentum developed for the European project to 
respond through deeper political and economic integration. Space precludes a detailed account 
of the processes that led to the 7 February 1992 signing of the Maastricht Treaty (see, for 
example, Baun, 1996, and Dyson and Featherstone, 1999), which provided for both political 
and economic and monetary union (EMU). The Communities became a Union with citizens. 
Convergence criteria and a timetable were set for the EMU process. The Maastricht Treaty 
undeniably embodied a series of significant steps forward. The question was whether the UK 
would take all of those steps together with its fellow Member States. The pragmatic response 
of  new Conservative Prime Minister John Major was to stay on board as far as possible and to 
negotiate opt-outs, opt-ins and derogations where the UK could not, or would not, take those 
steps. The most significant was the single currency. From the UK’s point of view there were 
two basic questions to be answered. Should it give its assent to the creation of a single currency? 
And, if so, should it be a part of it? The Labour Party’s answer to both questions was ‘yes’ (as 
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was that of the Liberal Democrats). For long, Labour had differentiated itself from the 
Conservatives by calling for ERM membership. But in 1990 Thatcher unexpectedly took 
sterling into the ERM. The Labour leadership concluded that differentiation could only be 
renewed through conditional support for membership of the currency union. Major’s conclusion 
was, first, that he could not any more stand in the way of moves to a single currency (his 
proposals for a parallel currency had gained no traction) but should make sure that the envisaged 
EMU was constructed on firm foundations; and, second, that the UK should adopt a wait-and-
see attitude to membership for sterling, by negotiating an opt-out.  
Major’s positions were unacceptable to the Euro-sceptics within his party, who believed 
that the answer to both questions should have been a resounding ‘no’. At the 9 April 1992 
General Election Major’s Conservative Party won a fourth consecutive victory but with a 
majority of just 21 seats. Major had successfully negotiated and signed the Maastricht Treaty. 
Now he had to steer its ratification through parliament. Sterling’s ignominious forced exit from 
the ERM on 16 September 1992 (‘Black Wednesday’) compounded a sense of outrage about 
the Treaty’s plans for a single currency. A relatively small group of rebel backbenchers, 
combined with the behaviour of Euro-sceptical ministers and Labour Party tactics designed to 
cause maximum discomfort for the government (primarily because of the opt-out of the Social 
Chapter) made the ratification process fraught, leading Major at one stage to call for a motion 
of confidence. One of the demands of the sceptics was for the Treaty to be put to a referendum 
(as it was in Italy, Ireland, France and Denmark – whose people voted twice, as the joke went, 
‘until they got the right answer’). In an echo of Campbell’s 1969 arguments (see above), they 
argued that, since all of the major parties favoured ratification, the British people had been 
denied any choice on the matter.  On 7 June 1993, during the Treaty ratification debate in the 
House of Lords, the Euro-sceptics’ figurehead, Thatcher, added her voice to those calling for a 
referendum (Thatcher, 1993, pp. 7-8). 
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Ultimately, the Maastricht Treaty was ratified and implemented – no small achievement 
given Major’s tiny majority. Major’s government subsequently soldiered on until 1997. 
European issues seemed never to go away. Major, who had begun his premiership wishing to 
put the UK at the heart of Europe, became increasingly Eurosceptical in his pronouncements, 
but it was never enough for the Euro-sceptics and the rebels, who were still determined to force 
a referendum.  
It was in this context, in the run-up to the 1997 General Election, that the referendum 
Kraken was re-awoken, as frankly admitted by Michael Heseltine in what he has recently 
described as being “the worst judgement of my political career” (Heseltine, 2016, p.19). A 
lengthy discussion took place between Major and Chancellor Ken Clarke, with the Prime 
Minister pushing for the prospect of a referendum “to achieve the semblance of party unity” 
(Heseltine, 2016, p.19). The discussion moved on to the single currency and Heseltine, who 
was the Deputy Prime Minister, suggested:  
As we were not going to do other than keep open the option in the light of events at an 
unpredictable time, we could consider a referendum if, after the election, we decided to 
join. This was the formula we agreed and which John subsequently announced. The 
limitations of the commitment were swept aside by the media. The rest is history, as 
David Cameron followed much the same route in his bid for the Tory leadership 
(Heseltine, 2016, pp. 19-20). 
 
This was undoubtedly the turning point that would lead inexorably to the 23 June 2016 
referendum. Once the Conservative Party had been returned to the Opposition benches, it 
accepted the idea of a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty and then the Lisbon Treaty. But 
its position could only morph in this way because the European integration process had been 
accelerated by the historical forces described above. The outcome of each of the EU’s Inter-
Governmental Conferences was a fresh target at which the referendum camp could aim, whilst 
underlining that the integration process was gathering speed and heading inexorably in a 
‘federalist’ direction, and equally emphasising each time that the British people had not ‘had 
their say.’ In effect, the Maastricht Treaty’s provisions on a single currency, and in particular 
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whether the UK should be in or out, became a proxy for the broader question of whether the 
UK should remain in, or leave, the Union itself. And when the prospects of sterling joining the 
single currency faded, one proxy was replaced by another (the Constitutional Treaty) and then 
another (the Lisbon Treaty). 
 
5. The proliferation of referendum promises (1997-2015) 
Major’s referendum commitment did not only open the floodgates for his own party. It 
was followed by a flurry of referendum commitments from the other two mainstream parties. 
In the case of Tony Blair’s Labour Party (uncertain, though this is now forgotten, of winning a 
sufficient majority to govern and assuming some sort of coalition arrangement with the Liberal 
Democrats would be necessary), there was a clear determination not to be outflanked tactically 
on the single currency issue13, but its manifesto also promised referendums on a whole platform 
of constitutional reform issues (voting system, devolution in Scotland and Wales, London 
mayor, regional governments). Where referendums were felt to be constitutionally appropriate 
– one more, on the single currency, did not feel so out of place. In addition to a referendum 
commitment on the single currency, the Lib Dems generalised their promise to ‘constitutional 
issues’ and ‘any transfer of power to European institutions.’ The latter was the first incarnation 
of what would later become the ‘referendum lock’ (see Table 1 below).  
 
  
                                                          
13 ‘Blair was too referendum-happy for my tastes but he had no alternative in 1997 on the single currency,’ declared 
Denis MacShane recently (author’s notes from a 14 October 2016 talk given at the LSE European Institutute’s The 
European Union in Practice seminar series). 
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Table 1: The proliferation of referendum promises (1997-2015) 
 
1997 
 
Conservative Party  Referendum on single currency 
Labour Party   Referendum on the voting system 
    Referendums on devolution in Scotland and Wales14 
    Referendum on establishment of London mayor 
    Referendums on regional governments 
    Referendum on single currency 
Liberal Democrat Party Referendums for constitutional issues 
    Referendum on ‘any transfer of power to European institutions’ 
    Referendum on single currency 
 
2001 
 
Conservative Party  We will keep the pound 
Referendum on ‘surrender’ of ‘any more of Parliament’s rights 
and powers to Brussels’ 
Labour Party   Referendum on the voting system 
    Referendum on single currency 
Liberal Democrat Party Referendum on the voting system 
    Referendums on elected regional assemblies 
    Referendum on single currency 
 
  
                                                          
14 As Butler and Kitzinger presciently observed (1976, p. 289), the use of referendums in the context of 
devolution would be the logical consequence of their use in the European context – and so it proved to be the 
case, from 1979 onwards.  
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2005 
 
Conservative Party  We will not join the euro 
    Referendum on the Welsh assembly 
    Referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty 
Labour Party   Referendum on the voting system 
    Referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty 
    Referendum on single currency 
Liberal Democrat Party Referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty 
    Referendum on single currency 
 
2010 
 
Conservative Party Referendum lock on ‘any proposed future treaty that transferred 
areas of power, or competences’ 
 Never join the euro 
 Referendum on any use of a ‘major’ ratchet clause in the Lisbon 
Treaty 
Labour Party Referendum on the voting system 
 Referendum on reform of the House of Lords 
 Referendum on single currency 
Liberal Democrat Party Referendum on national constitution 
 In/out referendum ‘the next time a British government signs up 
for fundamental change in the relationship between the UK and 
the EU’ 
 Referendum on single currency 
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2015 
 
Conservative Party No change to voting system 
 No to the euro 
 In/out referendum on a negotiated ‘new settlement for Britain in 
Europe’ before the end of 2017 
Labour Party ‘We will … give more power to people’ 
 No to the euro 
 In/out referendum lock on any ‘transfer of powers from Britain 
to the European Union’ 
Liberal Democrat Party In/out referendum on ‘any Treaty change involving a material 
transfer of sovereignty from the UK to the EU’ 
 
 
By the 2001 General Election, the Conservatives had switched to a ‘keep the pound’ 
stance (hence negating any need for a referendum), but had meanwhile borrowed the Liberal 
Democrats’ 1997 ‘lock’ concept, promising a referendum if ‘any more of Parliament’s rights 
and powers’ were ‘surrendered’ to Brussels (see Table 1 above). With some of its reforms 
already implemented, the Labour Party now limited itself to two referendum promises – on the 
voting system and on the single currency. The Liberal Democrats promised both, and made an 
additional referendum commitment for elected regional assemblies.  
The Conservatives maintained their stance on the single currency for the 2005 General 
Election (‘We will not join the euro’), but promised referendums on the EU’s Constitutional 
Treaty and on a Welsh Assembly. Labour added the EU Constitutional Treaty to its 2001 
promises on the voting system and the single currency, whereas the Liberal Democrats limited 
themselves now to the single currency and the EU Constitutional Treaty. In 2001, the 
Conservatives further firmed up their commitment on the single currency. Now, they would 
‘Never join the euro.’ But they not only revisited the referendum lock concept (promising a 
referendum on ‘any proposed future treaty that transferred areas of power, or competences’ 
 24 
 
(2001 manifesto)) but also promised a referendum on any use of a ‘major’ ratchet clause, as 
provided by the Lisbon Treaty. Since the Lisbon Treaty’s ratchet provisions were precisely 
designed to avoid heavy ratification procedures for minor Treaty changes, this promise would 
effectively prevent any Treaty change whatsoever. Labour added House of Lords reform to its 
existing commitments on the voting system and the single currency. The Liberal Democrats 
similarly promised a referendum on the single currency and further promised a referendum on 
a national constitution and an in/out referendum ‘the next time a British government signs up 
for fundamental change in the relationship between the UK and the EU’ (2001 manifesto). 
By the 2015 General Election, the Conservatives had sought further to distinguish their 
position in negating the need to even contemplate referendums, promising ‘No change to the 
voting system’ and ‘No to the euro’ (2015 manifesto). But took the final, fatal step in promising 
an in/out referendum on a negotiated ‘new settlement for Britain in Europe’ before the end of 
2017. Labour made a general promise to ‘give more power to people’ (2015 manifesto), and 
joined the Conservatives in saying ‘no to the euro’, but added a commitment to an in/out 
referendum on any ‘transfer of powers from Britain to the European Union (both from 2015 
manifesto).’15 The Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, limited themselves solely to promising 
an in/out referendum on ‘any Treaty change involving a material transfer of sovereignty’.16 In 
                                                          
15 Already, in January 2013, Ed Miliband quietly signaled that he would not repeal the coalition Government’s 
Referendum Lock Act were Labour to win a majority in 2015. This meant that Labour had already effectively 
committed itself to holding a referendum on the result of any future IGC.  
16 It should be noted that, although the former Lib Dem leader and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg consistently 
opposed an ‘arbitrary’ EU referendum, on the grounds that a vote should only be held in the event of further treaty 
change (the Referendum Lock position, in other words), it is by no means clear that he would have stood in the 
way of Cameron’s 2015 manifesto commitment to an in-out referendum, had the coalition government continued 
after the General Election. On 15 May 2014 he was asked on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme if opposition to a 
referendum was a "die in the ditch" stance that would prevent a further coalition. He replied: "I'm going to 
disappoint you now by not drawing great red lines on what may or may not happen." The New Statesman reported 
the same day that: ‘the odds are that he would accept an EU referendum as part of a second Tory-Lib Dem deal. 
The first reason is that it would dramatically enhance his bargaining power. In return for accepting Cameron's 
ultimate red line, he could demand radical action in areas such as "fairer taxes" (the one red line he set out today) 
and constitutional reform. The second is that having granted the Lib Dems a referendum on the Alternative Vote 
in 2010, the Tories will be in a strong position to argue that he should make a similar concession.’ (New Statesman, 
15 May 2014) Such analyses suggest that the theory that in 2015 Cameron had hoped for continued coalition as a 
way of letting him off the hook of his referendum commitment was a myth or, at best, wishful thinking.  
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1992 none of the three parties had promised a referendum on any EU matter (or on anything 
else). By 2015 all of them were promising in/out referendums on EU membership. In retrospect, 
Major’s 1997 promise on the single currency had acted as a sort of trigger: in the 1990s, there 
was absolutely no prospect of an in-out referendum, but by 2015 an in-out referendum of some 
sort had become a racing certainty. 
 
7. The proliferation of referendums in and about the EU (1997-2015) 
During the same period, there was a proliferation of referendums elsewhere on EU 
matters (see Table 2): Ireland and Denmark voted on the Amsterdam Treaty; Ireland voted 
(twice) on the Nice Treaty; nine candidate countries held accession referendums in 2003 (Malta, 
Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia – only Cyprus 
among the candidate countries did not hold such a referendum); Denmark (2000) and Sweden 
(2003) rejected joining the single currency; Spain and Luxembourg approved the Constitutional 
Treaty whilst France and the Netherlands rejected it and further referendums were planned in 
six other Member States (including the UK); Ireland voted twice (again) on the Treaty of 
Lisbon; Croatia (2013) voted on accession; Ireland (2012) voted on the Fiscal Compact; 
Denmark (2014) voted on the Unified Patent Court; Greece voted (2015) on its bailout 
conditions; Denmark (2015) rejected opting-in to the area of Justice and Home Affairs. The 
sheer quantity not only made the holding of referendums on EU matters seem commonplace17 
but further highlighted the absence of a referendum in the UK. Moreover, some Member States 
had rejected Treaties – most significantly, France and the Netherlands rejected the 
Constitutional Treaty – to the frustration of those Euro-sceptics who had wanted the UK to put 
a brake on the integration process. Lastly, a narrative grew about smaller countries being forced 
to reach ‘the right answer’; the Danish people rejected the Maastricht Treaty – and had to vote 
                                                          
17 See, for example, Mendez, Mendez and Triga, 2014 and Hobolt, 2009. 
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again; similarly, Ireland rejected the Nice and the Lisbon Treaties and had to vote again on 
each. The fact that substantive concessions and additional arrangements had been agreed each 
time was lost in the general impression created by Euro-sceptics that the EU was a conspiracy 
against the publics that it purported to serve. 
 
Table 2: The proliferation of referendums in and about the EU (1997-2016) 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty: Ireland (1998) and Denmark (1998) 
The Treaty of Nice: Nice: Ireland (x2) (2001 & 2002) 
The single currency: Denmark (2000) and Sweden (2003) 
Accession: nine candidate countries in 2003 (Malta, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, 
Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia) 
The Constitutional Treaty: Spain (February 2005), France (May 2005), Netherlands (May 
2005) Luxembourg (July 2005) 
The Lisbon Treaty: Ireland (x2) (2008 & 2009) 
The Fiscal Compact: Ireland (2012) 
Accession: Croatia (2013) 
Unified Patent Court: Denmark (2014) 
Bailout conditions: Greece (2015) 
Justice and Home Affairs Opt-Out: Denmark JHA (2015) 
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Netherlands (2016) 
 
 
8. Tactics and contortions 
As the inconsistency and changes on the referendum issue illustrate, the varying 
commitments entered into by the mainstream parties and their leaders were as much about 
tactics and party management as anything else. The contortions that party leaders had to go 
through in order to maintain some semblance of party unity or to win tactical electoral 
advantage led to situations that could be further exploited by Euro-sceptics and the pro-
referendum camp. Five examples illustrate this point.  
During the 1997 General Election campaign Conservative Prime Minister John Major, 
confronted with a rebellion over the single currency, but wanting to keep the two pro-European 
‘big beasts’ (Kenneth Clarke and Michael Heseltine) in his government to maintain party unity, 
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declared: “Whether you agree with me or disagree with me, like me or loathe me, don’t bind 
my hands when I am negotiating on behalf of the British people.” This “negotiate and then 
decide [stance] did not persuade the Euro-sceptics and … was difficult to sell to the electorate.’ 
(Butler and Kavanagh, 1997, p. 106). It was commonly regarded as being one of the more 
surreal moments in British political history and was caused essentially by managerial concerns 
about maintaining party unity rather than any matter of principle regarding membership of the 
future European single currency, about which John Major had always been openly sceptical. 
Other contortions would follow. 
In April 2004, in the run-up to the June European elections, Tony Blair made a sudden 
U-turn on the draft Constitutional Treaty. Until then, the party line had been that the treaty was 
a clearing-up exercise and that, despite its title, it didn’t justify a referendum. Then, suddenly, 
it did. When news leaked out: “Party strategists recognised the astuteness of the move. The 
referendum could not be held until at least autumn 2005, safely after the next General Election, 
and the Conservatives’ position would enable Mr Blair to turn it into an ‘in or out of Europe’ 
issue’ (Butler and Westlake, 2005, p. 92). However, a senior Brussels official observed: “It’s a 
strategically brilliant move if you are concerned with British politics through 2005 but arguably 
strategically disastrous if you are concerned with Britain’s long-term position in Europe” 
(Guardian, 20 April 2004). 
In his autobiographical account, Blair declares that “With deep misgivings, I accepted 
we had to promise a referendum on it. We couldn’t get the Constitution through the House of 
Lords without it, and even the Commons vote would have been in doubt” (Blair, p. 501). Later, 
he acknowledges: 
Our polls were resolutely against and not many people believed we could shift them. As ever, 
I was more sanguine. I thought we might just turn it into a referendum that was effectively: in 
or out. If France voted yes, Britain might just follow. My advisers disagreed, but I rather 
fancied mounting a really big public argument on an issue I felt strongly about and on which I 
was right (Blair, 2010, p. 530). 
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But a better indication of Blair’s inner judgement came when: 
 
Towards the end of our stay, the news came through during dinner: France had voted no to the 
Constitution. I knew at once I was off the hook. It was true I fancied the fight, but it was also 
true that had I lost it, it would have been au revoir. You could almost feel the waves of relief 
coming over the English Channel and making their way down to Italy (Blair, 2010, p. 531). 
 
In his political memoirs, Peter Mandelson gives a less guarded and more scathing account of 
what he described as ‘the referendum fiasco” (Mandelson, 2010, p. 386): 
None of this needed to become an election issue, but the Tories, much of the media, and a core 
of Labour ministers including Jack Straw, John Prescott and, latterly, Gordon (Brown), were 
pressing Tony to commit to a referendum before Britain signed up to the treaty. Tony was 
opposed to this: he felt that the proper route was to seek Parliament’s approval. Not only 
would a referendum be an invitation for (Michael) Howard to rally the forces of 
Euroscepticism; we might lose it. Besides, the issue was a needless distraction before an 
already tough election campaign (Mandelson, 2010, p. 382). 
 
Mandelson goes on to describe how Jack Straw remained adamant, and now added:  
 
A cogent political argument: by being the one party leader opposing a referendum, Tony 
would look like a lone voice against giving the British people a direct say in the EU’s future. 
Gordon and John echoed that message. In late April someone – Jack himself, Tony assumed – 
briefed reporters that the Prime Minister had changed his mind, and was now in favour of a 
referendum… Jack’s briefings created the impression that he had been bounced into a U-turn. 
‘I intended to take the whole thing at a different pace,’ Tony said. ‘I’ve screwed myself on 
this.’ He suddenly seemed not in control of events, and I told him so in no uncertain terms 
(Mandelson, 2010, pp. 382-383). 
 
In other words, party management and tactical considerations had been the overriding 
concerns that led to the referendum commitment. In any case, the longer-term significance of 
this particular ‘contortion’ has almost certainly been under-estimated. At the time, when he 
heard about Blair’s change of position, Elmar Brok, a leading German CDU/EPP Member of 
the European Parliament declared with bitter prescience; “This can only lead to calamity!”18 
More recently, UKIP’s former leader Nigel Farage declared. “Once Blair made the promise in 
2004 I always thought it was achievable.”19 
                                                          
18 As witnessed by an EU official who wishes to remain anonymous (interviewed by the author). 
19 4th October 2016 interview with the author. 
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The Constitutional Treaty was subsequently rejected by the French and Dutch 
electorates, but returned in a different format, after re-negotiation, as the Lisbon Treaty, and 
placed Blair’s successor as Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, in an awkward position. On 5 
March 2008, despite a rebellion by 29 of its own backbenchers, his government defeated a 
Conservative proposal to hold a referendum on the Treaty by 311 votes to 248. But Mr Brown: 
“Sparked anger by refusing to give the British people a say on the deeply unpopular treaty 
claiming that it was unnecessary because it was 'fundamentally different' from the constitution 
rejected by the French and Dutch three years earlier. … furious businesswoman Etta Cohen … 
said: 'You have broken a major manifesto promise. Why should we believe a single word you 
say?'” It was, continued the Daily Mail report “One of the biggest acts of political betrayal in 
modern British history” (15 April 2010). As a way of somehow differentiating his position from 
that of outright support for the Lisbon Treaty, Brown travelled late to Lisbon and signed the 
Treaty alone. The media and the sceptics were not convinced. 
The issue meanwhile split the Liberal Democrat party, whose leader, Nick Clegg, had 
ordered his MPs to abstain from the vote on the Lisbon Treaty. In the event, a quarter of Lib 
Dem MPs defied his order and voted in favour of a referendum, with three frontbenchers 
resigning to do so. Clegg explained that he agreed with the government’s stance on the Lisbon 
Treaty, but instead wanted a referendum on Britain’s EU membership (that is, an in/out 
referendum) to end ambiguities in the country’s relationship with Europe: “The prime minister 
once said that he would build a wider pro-European movement in Britain  [which would not be 
achieved by blocking] the in-out referendum that the British people really want” (Euractiv 
2008). 
For his part, then-Opposition leader David Cameron declared that Brown’s and Clegg’s 
decisions meant that “people feel cheated and cynical because promises made are promises 
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being broken” (The Guardian, 13 December 2007). Less than two years later, Cameron, still in 
opposition, confirmed:  
A complete U-turn on his "cast iron guarantee" that a Tory government would hold a public vote 
on the controversial treaty; the party chief said the Czech Republic's decision to ratify the 
agreement meant he could "no more hold a referendum on the treaty than ... a referendum on 
the sun rising in the morning." "The Lisbon treaty has now been ratified by every one of the 27 
member states of the European Union, and our campaign for a referendum on the Lisbon treaty 
is therefore over. Why?" he asked. "Because it is no longer a treaty: it is being incorporated into 
the law of the European Union.” Cameron said he understood how much the people of Britain 
would resent the fact there could not be a referendum but he claimed the "betrayal" was the 
Labour government's, "backed and matched" by the Liberal Democrats.’ (Guardian, 4 
November 2009) 
Promising to ensure such a situation would never arise again, Cameron said that, if 
elected to government, he would change the law so that a referendum must be held before any 
further powers could be passed to the European Union:  
We will make sure that this never, ever happens again. Never should it be possible for the British 
government to transfer power without the consent of the British people. If we win the next 
election, we will amend the European Communities Act 1972 to prohibit, by law, the transfer 
of power to the EU without a referendum. And that will cover not just any future treaties like 
Lisbon, but any future attempt to take Britain into the euro (Guardian, 4 November 2009). 
The impression of these contortions, emphasised by political rhetoric, of promises not 
kept, was adeptly exploited by Nigel Farage in 2014:  
The fact that we haven’t had a referendum on this has made people very angry because 
we keep being promised one, don’t we? Dave even gave us a cast-iron guarantee that 
‘If I become Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland there will be a 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty;’ and then of course he let us down like a cheap pair 
of braces…so we are becoming cheesed off because time and again we are promised a 
referendum and it has not been delivered’ (Farage, 2014).  
 
The 2015 General Election enabled UKIP and Farage to segue off the back of this 
argument by pointing to the fact that, despite winning 12.7% of the total vote, UKIP returned 
only one MP, whereas the Liberal Democrats returned eight MPs having won just 7.9% of the 
total vote. 
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9. The rise of the referendum parties 
No account of the Brexit referendum saga would be complete without mention of the 
growing role played by the referendum parties. In 1991 an LSE academic, Dr Alan Sked, 
founded the Anti-Federalist League, motivated essentially by anti-Maastricht Treaty sentiment. 
The League fielded 17 candidates in the 1992 General Election and all lost their deposits. In 
1993 Sked stood personally as a candidate in the Newbury and Christchurch by-elections, but 
failed to make any sizeable electoral dent.  
The Referendum Party was created on 27 November 1994 and bankrolled by a multi-
millionaire, James Goldsmith, who had been elected as an MEP in France, as part of an anti-
Maastricht Treaty coalition. The Referendum Party, like the Anti-Federalist League, was 
created as a reaction to the drafting and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. In the 1997 General 
Election the Referendum Party fielded candidates in 547 constituencies. The party polled over 
800,000 votes and finished fourth, with 2.6% of the vote, but did not win a single seat in the 
House of Commons. Moreover, ‘only a handful of Conservatives’ losses of seats’ could be 
blamed on the Referendum Party’s intervention. (Curtice and Steed, 1997, p. 308) 
Neither the Anti-Federalist League nor the Referendum Party survived intact for long, 
but the confluence of important elements from both parties led to the establishment and 
consolidation of the United Kingdom Independence Party (from 1993 onwards). UKIP was to 
remain a relatively ineffectual political party (for a period there was debilitating rivalry with 
the Referendum Party) until, as part of its reformist programme, Blair’s first administration 
introduced proportional representation for the 1999 European elections. Following on from the 
‘denial’ of a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, the 1999 introduction of PR for European 
elections, coinciding with a historic and record low for turnout in the UK (24% - the record still 
stands), gave UKIP its first elected representation (three MEPs). The return of Eurosceptic 
representatives in other Member States enabled the party to join a political group within the 
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European Parliament and thus enjoy significant financial and other resources. As Farage 
happily admitted: 
For us, the lifeblood of UKIP has been the European elections. Without the European 
elections, without getting three seats in 1999, without getting the resources that the 
European Parliament made available to us, without the letters ‘MEP’ after our names, 
UKIP would never have appeared on Question Time, or Any Questions or any of the 
major media programmes in this country. So we have always taken the European 
elections desperately seriously because without them and without proportional 
representation UKIP never had a chance, frankly, of winning any elective representation 
in the House of Commons (Farage, 2014).20 
 
UKIP’s elected presence in one parliamentary forum raised a subliminal question. While 
critics of the party asked why UKIP was entitled to so much representation in the media when 
it had so little representation in the House of Commons, those more sympathetic to the party’s 
arguments could equally reverse the question and ask why UKIP had so little representation in 
the House of Commons despite having sufficient representation in the European Parliament to 
merit appearing on such popular programmes. 
The elected presence of the party enabled UKIP to force the mainstream parties together 
in their apparent sameness on the referendum issue and to outflank them by offering a simple 
and clear choice. It was this perceived threat to vulnerable Conservative backbenchers that 
forced both Major and later Cameron into referendum promises they would surely rather have 
avoided if they possibly could have done so. 
The 2009 election of two (far right) British National Party MEPs enabled Farage to 
sanitise his party and his cause, by positioning himself and it to the left of the BNP. Despite 
increasingly playing the immigration card to the hilt and in a way that would have been 
considered toxic in the recent past in British politics, Farage avoided any practical alliance with 
Marine Le Pen’s Front National and was therefore able to distinguish himself from the ‘Far 
Right’ at home and abroad:  
                                                          
20 It is a moot point as to what will happen if the UK no longer returns MEPs as of 2019, for UKIP would no longer 
have its European platform nor access to European resources, a prospect recently considered by Rankin (2016). 
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One of my concerns is that the Eurosceptic argument across the Continent is in great 
peril and is in great danger of being taken over by what we know as the Far Right, 
although actually in economic terms they are all hard-line, statist socialists. I do not 
want the voice of Euroscepticism across Europe to be the voice that is led by Marine Le 
Pen or others far worse than her… I think it is really, really important that the 
Eurosceptic voice is seen to be something that actually believes and embodies liberal 
democracy (Farage, 2014). 
 
Moreover, as UKIP’s momentum grew, the party was increasingly able to use its binary 
message to turn the European elections into a proxy for the ‘denied’ referendum. As Farage put 
it in 2014: “… so I think some people will choose to use these European elections, in the absence 
of a referendum, as their means of expressing the word ‘no’’’ (Farage, 2014) . 
 
10. The constitutionalisation of referendums 
As seen in Sections 2 and 3 above, the absence of constitutional provisions about the 
organisation of and voting in referendums – in no small part because of their alien nature – 
contributed to the confusion surrounding the referendums in the 1970s. The 1975 referendum 
was necessarily enabled through a one-off Act of Parliament, for example, rather than by any 
reference to a standardised framework. The incoming 1997 Blair administration had promised 
to deliver a raft of constitutional and administrative reforms and had sought to legitimise these 
through the organisation of referendums at various levels. As a response to the absence of a 
standardised framework, and as part of an overall attempt to reform the United Kingdom’s 
political processes, the first Blair administration therefore brought to Parliament the Political 
Parties, Elections and Referendums Act of 2000 which, inter alia, sought to codify how 
referendum votes and campaigns should be conducted. The chapter titles of the Act give a good 
idea of the Act’s comprehensiveness:  
 Referendum period; 
 Date of poll;  
 Referendum questions;  
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 Permitted participants;  
 Declarations and notifications;  
 Assistance for designated organisations;  
 Designation of organisations to whom assistance is available;  
 Applications for designation;  
 Assistance available to designated organisations;  
 Referendum expenses;  
 Notional referendum expenses;  
 General restrictions relating to referendum expenses incurred by permitted participants;  
 Restriction on incurring referendum expenses;  
 Restriction on payments in respect of referendum expenses;  
 Restriction on making claims in respect of referendum expenses;  
 Disputed claims;  
 Financial limits;  
 General restriction on referendum expenses;  
 Special restrictions on referendum expenses by permitted participants; 
  Donations to permitted participants;  
 Control of donations to permitted participants;  
 Returns as to referendum expenses;  
 Auditor’s report on return;  
 Delivery of returns to Commission;  
 Declaration of responsible person as to return;  
 Public inspection of returns;  
 Restriction on publication etc. of promotional material by central and local government 
etc;  
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 Details to appear on referendum material;  
 Referendum campaign broadcasts;  
 Conduct of referendums;  
 Chief Counting Officers, and counting officers, for referendums; 
  Orders regulating conduct of referendums.  
The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act of 2000 enshrined the referendum 
in British constitutional practice. No longer would it be possible to argue on principle that the 
referendum was alien to British parliamentary democracy, for Parliament itself had legislated 
the legal framework with which referendums might be called and organised. No longer would 
it be possible to argue that referendums were constitutionally inappropriate – their usage would 
henceforth be a matter of political choice, enabled through parliamentary acts. And, as if to 
confirm that usage, on 5 May 2011 the United Kingdom held a referendum on the Alternative 
Vote as a possible alternative to the first-past-the-post electoral system. Earlier the same year, 
on 8 March 2011, Parliament had adopted the European Union Act, which institutionalised the 
referendum lock that Cameron had promised after his ‘U-turn’ embarrassment about the Lisbon 
Treaty. There was now no constitutional reason why the country should not hold a referendum 
on any matter deemed appropriate by Parliament and there was in addition now actually a 
positive provision in favour of a referendum on any future EU treaty that ‘transferred areas of 
power, or competences’ (European Union Act, 2011).  
In conclusion, the European Union Referendum Act of 2015, unlike the Referendum 
Act of 1975, was a standard constitutional device, foreseen and legislated for by Parliament in 
the more general framework of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act of 2000.  
  
 36 
 
11. Conclusion: chronicle of a referendum foretold and morals of the tale 
As this paper has sought to show, the principle of the use of the referendum in UK politics 
was first legitimised, then constitutionalised and, simultaneously, popularised. What was once 
a theoretical though radical option is now an accepted element in the constitutional tool box: 
referendums are no longer rare nor exceptional. Moreover, the use of the referendum is a 
growing phenomenon worldwide and not just limited to Western Europe nor, indeed, to the 
European Union nor the UK (Qvortrop, 2014). And the referendum, rather than the general 
election, has increasingly become a primary vector for electorates to express preferences on 
European issues (Hobolt, 2009, Mendez, Mendez and Triga, 2014).  
The 23 June 2016 referendum was not only ‘about’ David Cameron’s 2013 decision, 
nor was it only about the Conservatives and nor, ultimately, was it only about the United 
Kingdom. The UK’s mainstream parties had been toying with the idea since before the UK even 
joined the EEC in 1973 and had increasingly played with it after 1993. Indeed, the most 
proximate triggers for the slide down to 2016 were the quantum leaps in competences and 
powers foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty (notably, citizenship, the single currency, the Social 
Chapter, a common foreign and security policy) combined with slim parliamentary majorities 
and the rise of referendum parties – aided by the introduction of PR for European elections and 
the constitutionalization of referendums. The increasing incidence of referendums of various 
sorts elsewhere in the EU further encouraged the idea that in the UK it could, or should, be 
‘only a matter of time.’  
Indeed, only by taking an exceptionally short term view can one argue that the 2016 
referendum was a purely Conservative affair. Just thirty years after one great Labour leader 
(Attlee) had declared the idea anathema, another (Wilson) had made the promise a major plank 
of his electoral manifesto. Twenty-six years later, another (Blair) had enshrined the principle in 
the constitution (having already promised referenda on the single currency and the 
 37 
 
constitutional treaty). Just thirteen years after that, and thirty-nine years after Harold Wilson’s 
commitment, Ed Miliband had promised an in-out referendum in the event of any further 
transfer of sovereignty.  
Perhaps it was this underlying sense of inexorability across the mainstream political 
divide that led Craig Oliver, David Cameron’s former communications director, to insist in an 
interview that it was: “naïve to suggest the government had not needed to call the referendum, 
adding: “You could either deal with it now or the reality is it would pop up again in a few 
months or a few years” (BBC, 2016).21  
Taking the longer-term view about the UK’s relationship with the European integration 
process reveals several underlying trends, linking together events and developments over many 
years, that collectively were leading, with increasing inexorability, to a second referendum on 
EU membership. If not, at first, inevitable, those trends became increasingly so. They were also, 
for anybody who cared to take that longer-term view, increasingly discernible. But generations 
of British politicians, condemned to live in the short-term environment of electoral cycles and 
pragmatic party management, were seemingly oblivious to them. ‘Europe’ was seen as 
something ‘over there’, an occasional and mostly irritating intrusion erupting into domestic 
politics, rather than a constant presence and process. The result was a disproportionate emphasis 
on reaction rather than action, on tactics rather than strategy and, perhaps, on international 
relations adventures rather than patient diplomacy closer to home. Not even Thatcher and Blair, 
despite long periods in office and large majorities, were able to develop and maintain a coherent 
EU policy. The probable truth is that the UK never managed to achieve escape velocity from 
the dynamics of the 1950-1970 period so convincingly described by Alan Milward (2012). 
As I have argued elsewhere (Westlake, 2017), one last counterfactual question must 
remain tantalisingly unanswered: if the UK had held a referendum on the Constitutional 
                                                          
21 See also Oliver, 2016, p. 8. 
 38 
 
Treaty22 and, as the polls suggested at the time, rejected it (as did the French and the Dutch), 
would that have been a more calamitous scenario than the UK voting to leave in 2016? Put 
another way, if the UK electorate had already rejected something about the EU, if it had put a 
metaphorical foot down and said ‘so far and no further,’ if it had managed ‘at last’ to have a 
say on something, would it still have felt sufficiently strongly to vote to leave the EU altogether?  
In conclusion, it is reported that David Cameron believed his promised referendum 
would put the EU matter at rest within his party and the country at large for a long time. As the 
current and continued political, constitutional and juridical furore shows, he was mistaken in 
that belief.23 Indeed, several learned observers warned that the opposite would probably occur, 
whatever the result (see, for example, Oliver, 2016, pp 26-27 on “The Question of Future 
Referendums”). And that is perhaps a final irony of the 23rd June 2016 referendum: neither the 
referendum as a device, nor relations with the EU as an issue, have gone away. On the contrary: 
they are still very much present and promise to remain so for a long time to come.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
22 It should be recalled that Luxembourg persisted with its referendum after the Dutch and French rejections. If the 
British Government had so wished, it could also have persisted and although, as seen above, Tony Blair believed, 
with relief, that the French vote had let him ‘off the hook’, he was definitely up for the fight and thought such a 
referendum to be winnable, though other members of his government – notably Jack Straw – did not. (Blair, p. 
531) 
23 And one could have imagined just as much, if not more, furore if the result had gone the other way. 
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